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CRIMINAL LAW-RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS-EVIDENCE OF POSSES-

SioN-Kidd vs. The People-No. 14024-Decided October 5,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Kidd was convicted of receiving stolen property and sentenced.
1. Evidence was properly excluded that at the time and place
when defendant's person and property were searched, the property was
not found.
2. Possession of stolen goods is not an essential element of proof
of receiving.
3. Here the people did not prove or claim possession, but did
claim and offer evidence that a part of the goods had been sold and the
remainder stored elsewhere. Hence, the rejected testimony was imma-

terial.--Judgment affirmed.
et al. v~s. Monroe-No.
13794-Decided December 7, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.

DEEDS-NECESSITY OF DELIVERY-Monroe,

Monroe, plaintiff below, had a judgment canceling a deed from
his father, since deceased, to his children not including the plaintiff.
The court below canceled the deed on the ground that there had been
no delivery by the grantor prior to his death.
1. The case below was tried to the court. The court below
found on conflicting evidence that the deed had not been delivered by
the grantor to the grantee prior to the death of the grantor. The testimony clearly presented an issue of fact which the court, who heard the
witnesses, resolved in favor of the plaintiff.
2. We are bound by the fact findings of the trial court based on
conflicting evidence, which are supported by the record.--Judgrent

affirmed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating-Mr. Justice Holland dissenting.
OF COMPLAINT-The Rio
Grande Fuel Company vs. Colorado Central -Power CompanyNo. 13768-Decided December 7, 1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.

ACCOUNT-GUARANTY-SUFFICIENCY

The Colorado Central Power Company recovered judgment
against The Rio Grande Fuel Company for $699.80 for electrical
energy furnished. Suit was brought below both against The Rio
Grande Fuel Company and Bluebird Mines, Inc., but the latter de-
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faulted and default judgment was entered against it. The theory of the
complaint and the evidence was that it furnished electrical power for
the operation of the Bluebird mine in Jefferson County during a part
of 1932 and that the operations of the mine not being successful that
The Rio Grande Fuel Company agreed to purchase the output of the
mine and that The Rio Grande Fuel Company did advance and pay
part of the expenses of operation of the Bluebird mine. There was no
evidence that The Rio Grande Fuel Company originally assumed or
agreed to pay the bill or that it originally contracted the account.
1. Where the complaint is framed upon an original liability and
not upon a liability as a guarantor, such complaint is an admission that
no original liability existed and that the suit was not predicated on a
guaranty.

2.

The allegations of the complaint being insufficient to state a

cause of action on guaranty the plaintiff cannot shift from his original
pleaded action on original contract.
3. The evidence was insufficient to show that there was any
original liability on the part of The Rio Grande Fuel Company to pay
the power bill.--Judgment reversed.
GAMBLING-SLOT MACHINES-INJUNCTION AGAINST CITY TO RESTRAIN FROM INTERFERING WITH SLOT MACHINES-Walker et
al. vs. Begole as Mayor et al.-No. 13677-Decided December 14,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Walker and Shulman brought injunction to restrain the city of
Denver from destroying or seizing their slot machines, which they
alleged they installed in amusement places in Denver, the proceeds of
which were to be divided between themselves and the lessees or proprietors. These machines were known as "pin-ball" machines. The machines were operated by placing a coin in them, which released the balls,
which were then propelled by a plunger, and the balls falling into different slots determined what, if anything, it would pay. Writ of injunction was denied upon the sustaining of a demurrer to the complaint.
1. A demurrer does not admit legal conclusions in a complairt.
2. Where an implement is used or kept for the purpose of gambling it is immaterial that the machine pays nothing to the player.
3.
Injunction will not be granted to stay criminal or quasicriminal proceedings.
4. Injunction will not be issued to prevent a multiplicity of
suits where the purpose is to prevent a criminal action against the defendant based on the number of different criminal violations. Such a
defendant may not try all these questions in one injunction suit merely
to-prevent multiplicity of suits.
5. The demurrer was properly sustained and the judgment is
affirmed.
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MEDICINE -CHIROPRACTIC
-PRACTICING
WITHOUT A LICENSEWHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICING-Hurley vs. The People-No.

13752-Decided December 24, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Hurley was charged in one count of an information with unlawfully practicing medicine without a license and in a second count with
unlawfully practicing chiropractic without a license and was convicted
on both counts. The evidence disclosed that he was not treating any
patients nor diagnosing any cases but was conducting a school of healing
and giving lectures for pay to students and teaching a theory that disease
was caused by the body being out of equilibrium, and if restored and
adjusted to the center of gravity and kept so, that physical ills would
largely disappear.
1. It does not appear that anything taught by defendant is
within legislative inhibition or inimical to public health, safety, morals
or general welfare.
2. To visit criminal prosecutions because of it would not only
encroach upon defendant's right to engage in a lawful activity, but upon
the rights of those who wish to pursue the course of study.
3. The power of the judicial branch cannot be fitly invoked
under the circumstances here.
4. There was nothing in the record to indicate that defendant
was either engaged in the practice of medicine or chiropractic.
5. The schools of medicine and chiropractic being entirely different, it is inconceivable that defendant could be found guilty of a violation of both on the same evidence. His acts must have been in contravention of one or the other or of neither, but assuredly not of both.
Hence the verdicts were repugnant and inconsistent. Each negatived
the other. No form of verdict will be good which creates repugnancy
or absurdity in the conviction.-Judgment reversed.

SCHOOL DISTRICTS-LIABILITY OF OFFICERS FOR Loss ON SCHOOL

BONDS-Lemon vs. Giradot-No. 13814-Decided December 31,
1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Lemon, a taxpayer, was allowed to intervene in a suit brought by
School District No. 2 of Elbert County and two of its directors against
three former directors of the district for an accounting and judgment for
$15,000, upon the theory that the former directors had caused refunding bonds to be issued to take up a former bond issue and had delivered
the refunding bonds to the United States Bond Company for negotiation and that the bonding company had gone out of business and become bankrupt before the proceedings were completed, and of the refunding bonds, had disposed to innocent purchasers bonds of the value
of $15,000 without accounting to the district for any part of the proceeds, so that the school district was saddled with this additional debt
and the suit was on the theory that the directors were negligent and as
trustees were bound to account for the loss.
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1. Even if it be said that the school board exercised poor judgment in its selection of a bond broker and in the dealings that followed,
there is no claim that the board was not using its best judgment and
acting in good faith. Involuntary public officials are absolved from
errors in judgment and the results thereof.
2. The members of a school board are not liable individually for
the improvident but good-faith actions of the board when they lend
their time and sincere efforts for a public purpose without compensation.
3. Even if the board members are considered as trustees, their
relationship to the public is not changed. It was no less a governmental
function. The duty, whether a trust duty or otherwise, is still a public,
governmental duty to be performed within the discretion of the board,
in good faith, as an agency of the state, and when so acting, it did so in
a purely political or sovereign capacity.-Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Mr. Justice Burke specially concurring.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Young
not participating.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATOINS -WARRANTS-DEBTS-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRESUMPTIONS-TOWN
WARRANT FOR SERVICES
RENDERED OUTSIDE TOWN--Georgetown vs. Bank of Idaho

Springs-No. 13639-District Court of Clear Creek County,
Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge--On Rehearing-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action by bank as holder of a number of warrants issued
by the town to recover a judgment against the town of Georgetown.
The warrants were validly incurred by the town unless the board of
selectmen and officers had the power to incur the indebtedness and issue
warrants therefor.
HELD:
1. The board and officers had the power to incur the
indebtedness and issue the warrants therefor.
2. A municipality chartered by the Colorado Territory may
elect to become subject to the general laws passed under section 13, C. L.
1921, p. 2365, sections 9254 et seq.
3. Where a town fails to exercise the privilege of becoming subject to the laws (and Georgetown so failed), its original charter is the
sole measure of its powers, rights and liabilities, except in so far as that
charter has been amended or is in conflict with the Constitution.
4. The Colorado Constitution does not forbid a town receiving
its charter from Colorado Territory, and which fails to exercise the
privilege of coming under the general laws passed under section 13
(supra), from paying its warrants in the order of their registration,
regardless of the calendar or fiscal year.
5. The provision of section 8, article 11, of the State Constitution, which provides that no town shall contract "any debt by loan in
any form," except by means of an ordinance, etc., does not include
indebtedness incurred by the town for expenses and evidenced by warrants.
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6. The burden is on the town to overcome the presumption and
evidence of regularity of a warrant.
7. A warrant will not be condemned as invalid where it merely
appears that it was issued to an officer of the town for services rendered
outside the town as well as for services within.
8. An issue not within the pleadings and upon which there is
no assignment of error will not be considered.
The original opinion, which read for reversal, was withdrawn,
and the opinion herein is substituted therefor.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Campbell and
Mr. Justice Holland dissent.

ACTION TO RECOVER TAX ILLEGALLY AND ERRONEOUSLY LAID;
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-TAXATION -PROCEDURE - PLEAD-

ING-Lowden et at. us. Board of County Commissioners-No.
14073-Decided June 21, 1937-District Court of Lincoln
County-Hon. Arthur Cornforth, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiffs as trustee of a railroad owning property in
Lincoln County brought suit against County Commissioners to recover
taxes paid under protest which were allegedly illegally and erroneously
laid. The demurrers to the complaint were sustained by the lower court
on the ground that the plaintiffs did not plead that they had resorted to
"administrative remedies provided by the statutes * * * for the correction, abatement or refunding of such alleged erroneous and illegal tax,"
and that, therefore, they were not entitled to invoke the power of the
judicial branch of the government.
HELD:
1. Where a taxpayer, while protesting, pays a tax, a
portion of which is contended to have been illegally and erroneously
assessed by having the item for teachers' salaries so loaded that the levy.
made pursuant to the certification of a budget by the school board for a
special levy to raise the funds, resulted in an unconscionable and illegal
burden on the taxpayers, he has the right to invoke the power of the
courts to obtain a refund. And this is so although the plaintiff does not
allege that he has resorted to "administrative remedies provided by the
statute," for the objection raised is not one provided for by such statutes,
and, therefore, there is no opportunity for seeking administrative remedy.
2. Where there is alleged an abuse of discretion on the part of the
school authorities, but where the procedure, in making the levy, otherwise was within the law and the statutes, the complaint is good, as
against demurrer, without the allegation of resort to administrative
remedy before suit.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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vs. Kitely, etc., et al.-No. 14015-Decided June 21, 1937County Court of Denver-Hon. George A. Luxford, Judge-Re-

WILLS-CONSTRUCTION-LAPSED BEQUEST-INTENT-Bacon et

versed.
HELD:

1. In interpreting wills, the intention of the testator
governs.
2. The intent, if possible, must be determined from the will
itself and effectuated by the courts. If doubt exists, resort may be had to
certain recognized principles and rules of construction.
3. A legacy, generally, lapses by the death of the legatee, in testator's lifetime, if no successor be named.
4. In the case of a bequest to discharge a debt, the rule changes,
and the legacy does not lapse, because the thing in the testator's mind is
the debt, not the person; and if the debt had been paid in legatee's lifetime, it would have passed to his estate, and the testator's intent would
have thus been effectuated.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
PLEADING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - RECORD ON COUNTY
TREASURER'S CALL OF SCHOOL WARRANTS-COUNTY TREASURERS-SCHOOL DISTRICTS-Schoolleld vs. School District-

No. 14092-Decided June 21, 1937-District Court of Custer
County-Hon. James L. Cooper,Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
1. Since the right to plead the statute of limitations, as
given by statute, is special and personal, it is presumed waived unless

specially pleaded. The reason is prevention of surprise.
2. If the essential facts appear upon the face of the pleading, the
statute may be raised by demurrer; otherwise by answer stating such
facts, that the adversary may be advised.
3. Such facts as are presumably within the special knowledge of
the adversary, or depend upon his evidence and cannot be admitted by
the pleader without prejudice, would not come within the reason, and
hence, not within the rule. In such event, the pleader may make plain
his intent to rely upon the statute and await the evidence which demonstrates its applicability.
4.
Where plaintiff sues on warrants drawn on the general fund

of the school district, and the defendant pleads the statute of limitations
in the following words:
"That the cause of action therein stated is barred by the
statute of limitations of the State of Colorado for the reason
that this action was not commenced within six years next
after said cause of action accrued,"
the plea is good.
5. No statute requires the treasurer to keep a record of his calls of
school warrants, and where a record was kept, but so negligently as to
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be no evidence that no call was made, it will not be of use to the holder
of the warrants for there is a general presumption that officials do their
duty.
6. County Treasurers are not officers of school districts.
7. Sec. 8801, C. L. 1921, makes it a duty of the County Treasurer, on certain conditions to pay warrants. This section, when complied with, stops the interest on the warrants, and is for the protection
of the district, and was not intended to confer a privilege or an advantage
upon warrant holders.
8. Where the facts show that there was more than sufficient funds
to pay these warrants in the treasury much more than six years preceding
the bringing of the suits the statute pleaded is applicable and the suit is
barred.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Knous and Mr.
Justice Holland concur.
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-TRUSTS--ESTOPPEL-INSURANCE-In-

demnity Insurance Company of North America vs. Almina Smith
-No.
14001-Decided June 28, 1937-District Court of Weld
County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge-Judgment affirmed.
FACTS: Action to recover securities deposited by plaintiff in connection with the formation of the X Insurance Company. Statute
required furnishing bond to the insurance commissioner for a return of
money paid upon stock subscriptions in the event the organization of
the company was not perfected. Defendant issued its bond for such
purpose. The X Insurance Company obtained a subscription for stock
from plaintiff. For the purchase price thereof, she deposited the securities in question, under an agreement that she might return the stock
issued and receive back her securities. The X Insurance Company turned
said securities over to the defendant as collateral for the issuance of its
bond, and informed the defendant of all the facts. Trial court ordered
securities returned to plaintiff.
HELD: 1. This is an action based on a trust and not grounded
on fraud. Therefore, the five-year statute of limitations applies and not
the three-year statute.
2. The defendant insurance company, having been informed of
the contract by which the plaintiff could demand the return of her securities, is not a holder in due course, but a constructive trustee.
3. The plaintiff's failure to institute suit earlier did not injuriously affect defendant or change its position to its prejudice.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Knous concur.
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CONTRACTS-PARENT AND CHILD-RESCISSION--Caldwell vs. Mul-

lin-No. 14013-Decided June 28. 1937-District Court of
Denver-Hon. Frank McDonough, Sr., Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action to rescind contract for support and to compel reconveyance. Plaintiff conveyed all of his property to his daughter, the
defendant, who was his only living child, and would be his sole heir.
In consideration for this conveyance, it was agreed that the daughter
would support plaintiff during his life and upon his request reconvey the
property to him. Defendant refused to reconvey.
HELD:
The trial court's judgment that the property should be
reconveyed to plaintiff is justified. The judgment rests on the trial
court's finding of facts, and will-not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Concurred in by Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Knous.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-PREJUDICIAL ERROR-TESTIMONYEXPERTS-EVIDENCE-DEATH CERTIFICATES-Elleman et at.

vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al.-No. 14100-Decided March 1, 1937-DistrictCourt of El Paso County-Hon.
John M. Meikle, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
The husband of the plaintiff in error worked for a
plumbing and heating company as a truck driver. February, 1936, he
made a trip to Yuma, Arizona, and returned with a slight cold and
quite fatigued. He rested on the following day, and returned to work
on February 4, 1936, when, accompanied by three fellow employees,
they fought a blizzard and finally managed to reach the Edison school
where they were to install a boiler. There was no heat in the building;
it was bitterly cold, and the deceased's job was to cut a hole through an
18-inch concrete wall at a point directly above his head. While doing
so he inhaled more or less dust which arose from the cutting of the
concrete. He returned home all worn out, was not able to work subsequently and died February 14, 1936, of bronchial pneumonia. Plaintiff
in error contends that there was no evidence upon which the commission
and the lower court could base their judgment that the inhalation of the
cement dust was not the proximate cause of death.
HELD: 1. That a death certificate certified by a doctor stating
that the principal cause of death was bronchial pneumonia is prima facie
evidence in all courts and places of the facts therein stated.
2. That it is not prejudicial error to ask a medical expert whether
death was the result of an accident based upon his examination of the
death certificate alone. That such testimony is at least corroborative
testimony.
3.
That there being sufficient competent evidence to support the
findings, that there was no accident or injury arising out of the employment, the judgment will not be disturbed.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.

DICTA
STATUTES -MARRIAGE

-COMMON
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LAW -HEIRS

-NATURAL

AND

ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN-ANNULMENT-Valdez, as Guardian
of Rebecca Shaw, a minor, vs. Wilbur Shaw et al.-No. 13887Decided March 1, 1937-DistrictCourt of Rio Grande CountyHon. M. T. Hancock, Judge.
FACTS: Case arises out of proceedings in determination of heirship in re estate of Byron Shaw. Rebecca Shaw is the natural child of
the deceased, who lived with the mother of plaintiff in error, but who
never married her. At the time when they were living together, in such
a relationship that would have constituted a common law marriage, the
mother of the plaintiff in error was still married to Antonio Vigil. The
question arises whether the natural but illegitimate children of a deceased shall inherit.
HELD: 1. Section 5151, C. L. 1921, provides in effect that the
mother being deceased, the property of the father shall descend "To his
children surviving." But Section 5158, C. L. 1921, provides: "Illegitimate children shall inherit the same as those born in wedlock, if the
parents subsequently intermarry, etc." Reading these two sections together, it clearly appears that the surviving children to which reference
is made in section 5151 means those born in wedlock.
2. That as to plaintiff in error's contention that under Chapter
127, Section 6, Session Laws of 1933, a child born of a void marriage
is legitimate, the said Section 6 refers only to cases where an annulment
proceeding is brought and that no such proceeding was here involved.
Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Justice Bouck
concur.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-TAXATION-CONSTRUCTION OF TERMSPUBLIC SCHOOLS-POWER OF LEGISLATURE TO TAX FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-SCHOOL DISTRICT

-Wilmore, etc. vs. Annear, etc., et al.-No. 13902-Decided
March 1, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-HonorableCharles C.
Sackmann, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff as taxpayer for himself and others similarly
situated, sought to enjoin the State Auditor and Treasurer from issuing
and paying warrants disbursing to the various school districts of the
state on the basis of daily average attendance per capita certain moneys
appropriated for that purpose from the general funds of the state under
authority of Chapter 76, S.L. 1935.
HELD: 1. The Colorado State Constitution does not prohibit
the legislature from making appropriations from the general revenues of
the state for public schools.
2. A word repeatedly used in a constitution will generally be
given the same meaning throughout the instrument, whether such meaning is technical or popular in its character.
3. The power to appropriate for the-purpose set forth in an Act
does not exist without the power to tax for the same purpose. "The
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power to do either implies the power to do the other; the lack of power

to do either implies a lack of power to do the other."
4. The fact that such an appropriation never before has been
made nor appeared as a part of the general appropriation bill for public
schools does not tend to prove or disprove the existence of the power to
include such as a part of the bill.
5. Non-existent constitutional power cannot be acquired by legislative assertion; existent power is not lost by failure, for however long a
time, to exercise it.

6. Financial maintenance of the public schools of the state is a
state purpose and not a local or municipal purpose, and it is immaterial
that subordinate agencies of the government also may contribute to it.
7. A school district is not a municipal corporation within the
meaning of Section 7, Article 10 of the Constitution prohibiting the
general assembly from imposing taxes for the purposes of any "County,
City, town or other Municipal Corporation."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Holland dissents.
Mr. Justice Knous not participating.

WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT--COMMON
CARRIER, CONTRACT CARRIER-INTERSTATE COMMERCE-INTENT OF THE PARTIES--Qelle vs. The Industrial Commission of
Colorado and Claude ????----------No.
14093-Decided March
1, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Charles C. Sackman,
Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: A proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
The commission awarded compensation and its award was favorably
adjudged by the trial court. Plaintiff in error having a Wyoming license and Colorado permit to that end, but not having a federal permit,
operated a number of trucks between Denver and points in Wyoming
by means of which he served a published list of customers by contract
but did not serve the general public. He employed claimant, on a weekly
wage basis, to drive one of the trucks, and preparatory to claimant's first
trip, new tires were purchased for the truck he was to drive, and in the
course of their installation by the tire agency, the employer and claimant
assisting therein, one of the tires exploded and injured claimant.
HELD:' 1. That the fact that both the claimant and his employer
were aiding in the tire installation is consistent with the view that they
regarded it as within the course of the employment.
2.
That plaintiff in error was a "contract carrier" and not a
common carrier" engaged in interstate commerce so as to be exempt
under the Compensation Act.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and

Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
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WATER RIGHTS -DECREES
- APPROPRIATION-PAROL TESTIMONY
-CONFLICTING
EVIDENCE-Nicoloff vs. The Bloom Land and

Cattle Company-No. 13784-Decided March 1, 1937-District
Court of Las Animas County-Hon. A. C. McChesney, Judge.
FACTS: The Bloom Company, defendant in error, brought suit
to restrain Nicoloff, the plaintiff in error, from interfering with water
which the company alleged it and its predecessors in title had already
appropriated. The waters in controversy consist principally of seepage.
The company owned a ranch and a ditch, the ditch running approximately parallel to the Las Animas River. Under a 1903 decree the
company owned a priority to water in the river. The land above the
ditch had a southeasterly dip toward the river, and considerable flood
and seepage came down this slope and had been for decades captured by
the company and its grantors in the ditch and had been duly appropriated for irrigation. The company claimed these flood and seepage waters
in addition to its decreed water rights. Nicoloff, in 1934, dug a ditch
farther up the slope and intercepted the waters, carrying them off to
certain fish ponds.
HELD:
1. That a decree as to specific water rights cannot be
altered by parol testimony.
2. That such a decree does not curtail the right of the landowner
to make further appropriations as needed, and any such further appropriation is not defeated by the fact that it has not yet bee n, and may never
be, protected by a decree.
3.
The evidence being in substantial conflict on all the material
issues of fact, the District Court's determination of these in favor of the
company is binding upon the Supreme Court, and requires the affirmation of the judgment rendered.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Young concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - AWARDS - REHEARINGERROREVIDENCE OF CHANGED CONDITIONS-Allen et al. vs. Gadbois

and the Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 14098-Decided March 8, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. Frank
McDonough, Sr., Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: This is a workmen's compensation case and reference is
made to plaintiffs in error as plaintiffs, and the defendants in error as
claimant and the commission respectively. Claimant suffered a conceded
compensable injury March 5, 1932. Claim was made for compensation,
liability was admitted and an award was entered June 1, 1933. Claimant petitioned for review in August, 1934, and November, 1935; hearings were had and in May, 1936, the commission again entered a supplemental award, finding claimant had not established any change in
condition, error or mistake. On claimant's petition for rehearing on
June 11, 1936, and without a hearing or evidence, the commission,
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August 14, 1936, entered an award giving him additional compensation, and this award was affirmed by the District Court. The question
is, did the court err in failing to hold that the findings made by the
commission did not support the award?
HELD: 1. "That reasons for findings are mandatory and apply
to errors as well as changed conditions and mere change of mind with
no: statement of sufficient reasons therefor is no compliance with the
law."
2. "That on prior reviews it improperly weighed the evidence,"
would be a sufficient statement by the commission to grant a rehearing
and to change the award, if there was a sufficient statement of reasons
for the change. But to change the award there must be additional hearings, and evidence of changed conditions.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.

OF COURT-LEADING
RAPE -ELECTION-EVIDENCE-DISCRETION
QUESTIONS-PREJUDICE-DATE OF ACT-Wills vs. State of

Colorado-No. 14105-Decided March 8, 1937-DistrictCourt
of Mineral County-Hon. John B. O'Rourke, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as the defendant,
was convicted of statutory rape and sentenced to a term of from nine to
fifteen years in the penitentiary. Defendant admitted having slept with
-the sixteen-year-old girl on a few occasions, but denies ever having carnally known her.
HELD: 1. The district attorney's election to rely on an offense
in a bunkhouse on or about March 26, 1935, before the defense began
its case, was not error. The time when an election should be made is
within the discretion of the court.
2. That the court-'may permit the asking of leading questions
concern:ng the perpetration of the act, when the act is relied upon for
conviction, and the circumstances necessitate it.
3. That the court counteracts any prejudice that might be caused
by conduct of bystanders, by promptly taking steps to suppress the improper conduct, and by directing the jury not to give it any attention,
but to decide the case according to the evidence.
4. No definite date for the commitment of the alleged act is required; it is sufficient if the approximate date is established.
5. Facetious remarks by the district attorney about the defense
counsel are not approved of by the court, but they are not prejudicial to
the defendant.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
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DECLARATORY JUDGMENT---CONSPIRACY-ERROR-SUFFICIENCY OF

FACTS-TOWNS-GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY-Lueras et at. vs.
Town of Lafayette et a.-No.
13828-Decided March 8, 1937District Court of Boulder County-Hon. Claude C. Coffin, Judge
-Affirmed.
FACTS: A proceeding under the declaratory judgment act. Plaintiffs in error, of Spanish descent, citizens of the United States and residents of Lafayette, charged that the town and a governmental activity,
the fire department, had conspired and had denied the plaintiffs in error
"their right to the use of a certain public swimming pool of the town
of Lafayette."
The fire department is voluntary and not under the
control of the town, and leased the incompleted pool from the city.
They put a sign up reading: "Firemen's Pool. We reserve the right to
reject any or all persons without cause. White trade only. Lafayette
Fire Dept."
HELD: 1. That the lease of the pool was not made in furtherance of a scheme and conspiracy to prevent its use by petitioners.
2. That the showing on the part of the plaintiffs in error was
indefinite and uncertain.
3.
That the declarations sought by plaintiffs in error are things
obviously obtaining, and to declare "that a statute is a statute," "or that
a Spanish-American is a Spanish-American," tends to solve no problem
involved here.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
CONTEMPT

OF COURT-EVIDENCE -DISCRIMINATION

TION-CITY OFFICIALS--State of

JURISDIC-

Colorado et al. vs. Lowry and

Fogg-No. 13811 -Decided March 15, 1937-DistrictCourt of
Dener-Hon. George F. Dunklee, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Action to review certain contempt proceedings had in the
District Court, which was a part of the original proceeding based upon a
petition for a peremptory writ of mandamus brought by certain negroes
to compel Lowry, Manager of Improvements and Parks, and Fogg,
Commissioner of Supplies, to comply with the Civil Rights Statutes and
therefore not discriminate against the negroes as to days when they could
or could not swim at places of public accommodation. The writ was
issued and subsequently an advertisement appeared in the Denver Post
designating which days negroes were to swim at the Curtis Park pool.
It was not known who was responsible for the placing of the advertisement nor who paid for it. Citations of contempt were issued out of the
District Court against said Lowry and Fogg, and the court found they
were not in contempt.
HELD:
I. In reviewing contempt proceedings, the Supreme
Court is confined to the determination of whether the trial court had
jurisdiction and regularly pursued its authority; and there was no ques-
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tion but what the court had jurisdiction and no doubt but what it regularly pursued its authority.
2. There is sufficient evidence to indicate that the lower court was
entirely justified in finding that at the time these alleged discriminations
were taking place Lowry and Fogg knew nothing about it.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
MOTION TO VACATE-DISCRETION OF COURT-RIGHTS OF EXECUTORS-PRESERVATION OF THE ESTATE-EVIDENCE-The Lon,-

don Option Gold Mining Company ts. Dempsy and McDonaldNo. 13930-Decided March 15, 1937-District Court of Park
County-Hon. James L. Cooper, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The parties will be herein designated as they appeared in
the trial court, i. e., defendants in error as plaintiffs, and plaintiff in
error as defendant. Plaintiffs are executors of the estate of Albert J.
Dempsy, deceased, who was the owner of a certain mining property, and
Jid execute a lease which, with his consent, was assigned to defendant.
Executors entered into an agreement with the defendant as to the property, providing that if defendant did not operate the property as provided
for, the agreement under which it had possession would be terminated
at the option of the estate. Defendant breached and plaintiff filed their
complaint in the District Court. The defendant not entering an appearance, judgment was given to the plaintiff. Subsequently, the defendant
moved the court that the judgment and decree be vacated. No grounds
were stated as a basis of the motion, but it was supported by eight affidavits, and the court ordered the judgment be vacated. A supplemental
complaint was filed, trial had, and decree and judgment was entered for
plaintiffs. The only specific error assigned by plaintiff in error is that
the court erred in denying admission in evidence of nine documents
which it offered.
HELD:
1. A motion to vacate must be filed during the term in
which the judgment was entered.
2.
The "motion to vacate" rests in the sound discretion of the
court, and unless such discretion was abused, its action thereon will not
be disturbed.
3.
If, to preserve the estate, the executors executed the agreement,
then they had the right to enforce it for the benefit of the estate.
4.
The documents not admitted into evidence were made prior to
the above mentioned agreement and are therefore immaterial as affecting
the rights of the executors, or the title of the estate to the property involved.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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JUSTICE COURT-COUNTY COURT-FIXING OF, REVIVAL OF ISSUES
-REPLEVIN -DAMAGES
-Summers vs. Mock-No. 14087-

Decided March 15, 1937-County Court of Montrose CountyHon. Earl J. Herman, Judge-Reversed.
HELD:
1. That an appeal lies from the Justice Court to the
County Court, and that the trial de novo can be only upon the issue
presented in the Justice Court.
2. The plaintiff in a replevin suit in the Justice Court fixing the
issue upon the question of damages based on the value of the property
sought to be replevined, and not upon the question of possession, is
limited to the same issue in the County Court and cannot revive the
question as to possession.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Hilliard concur.
JUDGMENTS, VOID AND VOIDABLE -MANDAMUS
-TAX
LEVYSCHOOL DISTRICT-DAY IN COURT--STATE-JURISDICTION-

EQUITY-Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Co. vs. School
District No. 2 of Fremont County and Hyde-No. 13890-Decided March 15, 1937-District Court of Pueblo County-Hon.
John H. Voorhees, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Hyde instituted an action in the District Court of Pueblo
County and obtained judgment by consent of defendant against School
District No. 2 of Fremont County. The judgment was in mandamus
ordering a levy to pay the money judgment, and the issuance and delivery to Hyde of funding bonds. Thereafter, certain taxpayers, plaintiffs
in error here, filed a petition asking for the vacating of the judgment and
that they be allowed to appear and defend the suit. Plaintiffs in error
alleged that the judgment and mandamus for a levy were obtained fraudulently and constitute a fraud upon the taxpayers.
Hyde contends that inasmuch as the bonds were transferred to the
State of Colorado, no action can be taken on the petition until the state
has consented to become a party and entered its appearance in the proceedings.
HELD: 1. A judgment by a court having jurisdiction, where
said judgment is obtained through fraud or collusion, is voidable only,
not void, and hence not subject to collateral attack as: the railway company suing for the return of taxes paid under the herebefore mentioned
levy.
2. The state having paid full value for the bonds, it has a vested
interest in the judgments such that it cannot be deprived of it in a proceeding to which it is not a party and also because the maintenance of
the judgment is essential to the preservation of any rights of the state.
3.
Equity looks to substance rather than form and rights cannot
be destroyed unless and until the one. who possesses them has had his
day in court.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke dissents.
Mr. Justice Bouck specially concurring.
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CONSPIRACY -LARCENY
BY BAILEE -EMBEZZLEMENT-.STATUTES
-CRIME
BAILMENT SPECIFIC INTENT INDICTMENTPREJUDICE-SUPREME COURT PRACTICE-ADMISSION OF EvIDENC--COLLATERAL FACTS-INTENT AND PURPOSE-Helser

and O'Hanlon vs. State of Colorado-No. 13789-DecidedMarch
15, 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Otto Bock, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: The indictment returned against the plaintiffs in error
contained three counts intended respectively to charge the defendants,
now plaintiffs in error, with conspiracies to commit: (1) Grand larceny,
(2) larceny by bailee, and (3) embezzlement. Upon trial, Helser
and O'Hanlon were found not guilty on the first count; were both found
guilty on the second count, and Helser guilty and O'Hanlon not guilty
on the third count. Plaintiffs in error admit that the conspiracy is
sufficiently alleged in both counts but contend that the object of the
conspiracy in each instance is not shown by the indictment to be any
crime known to either the common law or the statute and that these
counts are fatally defective in not alleging every element necessary to
constitute the objective felony as fully as if the indictment was for the
perpetration of the offenses of larceny by bailee and embezzlement.
HELD: 1. It is unnecessary to charge the object of the conspiracy
in the precise words of the statute; so long as the allegations of a conspiracy indictment show that the object of the conspiracy is a crime defined by statute it is sufficient.
2. The allegation in the indictment that the defendants, now the
plaintiffs in error, were president, vice-president, etc., at the time they
were charged to have converted the money of the company to their own
use, as definitely charges a bailment as though it was averred in express
terms.
3. The indictment definitely averred a felonious taking and carrying away as the object of the conspiracy, and this sufficiently implies
an intent on the part of the takers to steal without an allegation of the
specific intent.
4. A criminal indictment charging that a person "embezzled"
money has the same effect as if the word "embezzlement," the statutory
name of the crime, had been included in the charge.
5. If the indictment charges the intended crime by its statutory
name, there is no need of alleging the statutory ingredients of the crime.
6. The Supreme Court has consistently refused to reverse criminal
proceedings for technical defects in the information or indictment which
do not tend to prejudice the substantial rights of defendants on the
merits.
7. In conspiracy cases an unusual latitude must be permitted in
the admission of evidence.
8. "Where the guilt of a party depends on the intent, purpose, or
design with which an act is done, or on his guilty knowledge thereof,
collateral facts in which he bore a principal part may be examined into
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for the purpose of establishing such guilty intent, design, purpose, or
knowledge. It is sufficient that such collateral facts have some connection with each other as a part of the same plan or as induced by the same
motive, and it is immaterial that they show the commission of other
crimes."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr.
Justice Holland dissent.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE - ADMISSION OF TESTIMONY-QUESTIONS OF FACT AND OF LAW-

Industrial Commission of Colorado et al. vs. Wetz et al.-No.
14057-Decided March 15, 1937-District Court of DenverHon. Otto Bock, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: The defendants in error, mentioned herein at claimants,
filed a claim before the Industrial Commission under the Workmen's
Compensation Act for death benefits. Decedent was working for the
City and County of Denver in the highway department. On February
15, 1936, a c6ld morning, the temperature being approximately zero,
the deceased attempted to start a Fordson truck, and shortly after was
found dead sitting on the floor by the side of the machine with a hot shot
battery between his legs. There was much carbon monoxide gas and
carbon dioxide gas in the garage which had affected two other employees.
The evidence is uncontradicted that decedent's death was the result of a
right dilatation of the heart, but as to what caused this dilatation the
examining surgeons could not ascertain. Claimant contends that her
husband's death was the result of overexertion, electric shock and carbon
monoxide poisoning. There is no evidence that deceased cranked the
truck, or received an electric shock, but there is testimony that the usual
procedure is to crank the truck before hooking up the hot shot battery.
The claimants being unsuccessful before the commission, instituted an
action in the District Court to review the findings and award, which
court set aside the order of the commission and remanded the case with
directions to enter an award in favor of claimants.
HELD: 1. The circumstances disclosed by the evidence are sufficient to prove that the deceased shortly before his death had engaged in
cranking the tractor, and there is direct testimony that the motor was
cold and that cranking it in such condition requires considerable exertion.
2. The claimants were not required to demonstrate the cause of
the dilatation, but merely to show its cause by competent evidence, and
circumstantial evidence is competent.
3. What constitutes evidence is a question of law.
4. In the light of the uncontroverted circumstances that deceased
appeared to be in good health; that he was doing work that customarily
involved considerable exertion; that he was breathing an atmosphere
charged with a small amount of poisonous carbon monoxide and a large
amount of carbon dioxide sufficient to affect noticeably two other workmen; and that either exertion or the atmospheric condition alone could
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cause dilatation; and in the absence of any testimony of other medical
experts as to any other probable causes of dilatation, the trial court was
right in holding that as a matter of law there was uncontroverted evidence of sufficient cause of the dilatation.
5.
In making findings of law from which conclusions of fact must
of necessity follow, the trial court does not thereby usurp the fact-finding
function of the commission.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice
Holland dissent.
FLOOD WATERS-NEGLIGENCE-INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-ERRORJURY - PROXIMATE CAUSE - EVIDENCE - The Northwestern

Terminal Railroad Co. et al. vs. Antonio Pilo-No. 14115-Decided March 22, 1937-District Court of Adams County-Hon.
S. W. Johnson, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Plaintiffs in error are hereinafter referred to as the railways, and defendant in error as Pilo. Pilo brought suit against the
railways for damages claimed for the flooding of his premises and destruction of his property due to the negligent construction and maintenance by them of a certain bridge. On a verdict in his favor for
$1,750 judgment was entered. The railways assign three errors to the
court's refusal to give three instructions which amounted to this: (1)
If sufficient water overflowed below the bridge to cause Pilo the same
damage, regardless of the bridge, verdict should be for the railway.
(2)
If a portion of the water which caused the damage overflowed
below the bridge and a portion of that damage was caused by the construction and maintenance of the bridge, and the jury was unable to
apportion the damage as between the two, verdict must be for the railways. (3)
If a portion of the damages complained of were caused by
the bridge, and a portion by overflow between the bridge, the railways
could be held only for the former.
HELD: One instruction given limited liability to proximate cause,
and another instruction given correctly defined proximate cause, and
these were emphasized and clarified by others given; if the jurors followed said given instructions, they could not possibly have fallen into
any of the errors which counsel sought to guard against by the refused
instructions.
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Burke. Mr. Justice Hilliard and
Mr. Justice Bakke concur.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS--SALOONS-INJUNCTION-MOOT ACTIONS
-REPEAL
OF AMENDMENTS BY IMPLICATIONS-REVENUEOLD AGE PENSION AMENDMENTS--SUPREME COURT RULES-

George Golden et al. vs. State of Colorado ex rel. Baker, District
Attorney-No. 13888-DecidedMarch 22, 1937-DistrictCourt
of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS: Plaintiffs in error are hereinafter referred to as the town,
and the defendants in error as the District Attorney. The District At-
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torney brought injunction to restrain the town from issuing licenses for
the retail sale of intoxicating liquor on the theory of the unconstitutionality of the statute purporting to authorize the issuance. The town's
demurrer for want of facts was overruled, it elected to stand, and the
writ was issued.
HELD: 1. As to the contention that this is not a case for injunction: Assuming the construction of the constitutional provision maintained by the District Attorney, and considering that it provides no
penalty for its violation, he was without legal remedy and hence the
suit was maintainable.
2. As to the motion to dismiss the action as moot, because newly
elected officials, notwithstanding the writ, issued the licenses: In view
of the statewide public interest, and inasmuch as the question can only
be put at rest by judgment, the motion must be denied.
3. At the general election of 1932, Article XXII of the State
Constitution was adopted, which repealed, as of the date June 30, 1933,
all statutes relating to intoxicating liquors, but expressly provided that
there shall be no saloons. At the general election, following, the "Old
Age Pension Amendment" to the Constitution, known as Amendment
No. 4, was adopted, which provided: (1) that the Old Age Pension
Fund was to get 85% of "all net revenues accrued or accruing, received
or receivable" from intoxicating liquor taxes "of whatever kind."
(2)
That no law providing revenue for the Old Age Pension Fund shall be
repealed or amended unless, at the same time, substitute revenue in an
equal amount be provided. Following the enactment by the General
Assembly of Chapter 142, licenses were issued and "saloons," if such
they be, established thereunder have since been operating generally
throughout the state. Thus the revenue raising provisions of said Chapter 142 were incorporated into, and are now a part of, the Constitution,
with the result that said Article XXII has been modified as to its prohibition against the establishment and maintenance of any saloon, and
those places here in question which had provided, and were providing,
such revenue were legalized.
4. The people, if they so desire, may write into their Constitution
any provision they wish which does not conflict with the Constitution
of the United States, and that power is in no way impaired by the fact
that the proposed amendment was or was not theretofore statutory, or,
if statutory, valid or void.
5. Since this question was not, and could not be argued by counsel, the prohibition of Supreme Court rule 48 does not apply to a petition for rehearing herein.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Justice Young and Mr.
Justice Bakke dissent. Mr. Justice Hilliard delivered the dissenting

opinion.
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WATER RIGHTS-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-DECREES, CONDITIONAL-ABSOLUTE-PRIORITIES-The
Trinchera Irrigation

District vs. The Trinchera Ranch Company et al.-No. 13498Decided March 22, 1937-District Court of Costilla CountyHon. John I. Palmer, Judge-Reversed with Directions.
FACTS: Proceeding for the adjudication of water rights were had
in the trial court and a decree entered. It is this decree which the district
now seeks to have reversed.
HELD: 1. In water adjudication. matters it has not been unusual
to uphold decrees without requiring strict compliance with the customary law of practice and procedure.
2. Some Colorado jurisdictions enter conditional decrees, where
there is a distinction between water actually applied to beneficial use,
entitling one to absolute decree, and water not yet applied in a legal
sense, i. e., other rights.
3. The priorities are decreed in general and unlimited terms.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Young concur.
STATUTES-LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS-RULE
MAKING-RIGHTS--STATE EMPLOYEES PENSIONING ACT-The

State Employees' Retirement Board vs. McKelvey-No. 14113Decided March 22 1937-DistrictCourt of Denver-Hon. Frank
McDonough, Sr., Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant in error, herein designated as petitioner, is
seeking to obtain an annuity from plaintiffs in error, herein called the
board, which denied petitioner's application for an annuity in September, 1936. Petitioner sued out a writ of certiorari in the District
Court, and the court entered judgment remanding the cause to the board
with instructions to grant the application for an annuity. The act
relating to the pensioning of certain classes of state employees after
retirement from office provided, among other things, that every present
employee who becomes a member of the association, shall pay in, a
sum, equal to all accrued deductions from his or her salary which would
have been made had such employee become a member August 1, 1931,
with interest thereon, etc. The association passed Rule 5 providing in
effect that if any monthly payment is not made within 60 days from
the due date, membership would lapse and all right shall be forfeited
except the right to receive back upon demand within two years from date
of last payment the accumulated deductions and direct payments standing to the credit of his or her individual account. Petitioner had come
within the default provision of this rule, but had tendered the back
payments plus the acquired interest, and was refused an annuity.
HELD: 1. Inasmuch as the act states that no contract right
exists, then any other right, as the right to an annuity, must arise by
virtue of statute, and the statute does not limit the time within which
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the payments are to be made in order that statutory rights to an annuity
accrue or terminate.
2. The rule-making power is limited to making rules for the
administration of the fund and transaction of the business of the association and is "subject to the limitations of this act, and of the law."
Therefore, rule 5 goes further than the section of the statute, under
authority of which it was adapted, permits.
If a limitation as to when a right that has arisen under an act,
3.
passed by the General Assembly, shall cease to exist is to be imposed it
must be by legislative act and not by administrative rule.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Justice Holland not participating.
CONFLICT OF LAWS--CONDITIONAL SALES-COMITY--Castle vs.
Commercial Investment Trust Corp.-No. 13804-Decided
March 22, 1937-District Court of Denver-Hon. H. E. Munson, Judge-Reversed.
The defendant in error brought action in replevin
FACTS:
against the plaintiff in error to recover possession of an Auburn automobile. The parties will be herein designated as they appeared in the
trial court, i. e., defendant in error as plaintiff, and plaintiff in error
as defendant. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff defendant brings
cause to Supreme Court by writ of error. Matlin purchased a car from
the Valley Motor Sales, Inc., of Utica, New York, under a conditional
sale contract recorded in New York. The motor company assigned the
contract to the plaintiff. Matlin removed the car from the state of New
York and it was purchased in Colorado by Kelton, Inc., and from it
by the defendant herein for value in the regular course of business, and
without knowledge of the foregoing contract or of its being recorded
in the state of New York.
HELD:
1. The title retaining contract here involved does not
give the plaintiff a right to the automobile superior to that of one who
purchases it in Colorado in the regular course of business without
knowledge of the existence of the contract.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Bouck concur.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

-

SUNSTROKE

-

HEART TROUBLE

DIRECT CAUSE-Wood et al. vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado et al.-No. 14090-Decided March 22, 1937-District
Court of Denver-Hon. Robert W. Steele, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS:
Action brought under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Deceased, a glazier, was working on a scaffold about two feet
high. The coroner called was unable to find any actual cause of death,
such as a fracture or a definite fall, and without holding an autopsy
made a return that death was due to heart trouble, and that the contributing cause of death was heat exhaustion and heart stroke. Deceased was obese, had had heart trouble, and the day was very hot.
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1.
"The mere fact of sunstroke does not constitute a
HELD:
death resulting therefrom an 'accident' within'the statute, and harm
resulting from a heat stroke is compensable only where the heat stroke
is the direct and superinducing cause of the harm."
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
WARRANTIES-BURDEN OF PROOF-SALES-PUFFING---OPINION OF
SELLER-UNIFORM SALES ACT-REMOTE DAMAGES-EvIDENCE-NONSUIT-Elliott vs. Parr et al.-No. 13976-Decided
March 22, 1937-DistrictCourt of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
Plaintiff in error was plaintiff below and defendants in
FACTS:
error were defendants below; and herein will be referred to as plaintiff
and defendants. Plaintiff purchased a cream separator from defendant
on trial and approval. Plaintiff approved of it and the sale was consummated. There was no clear and unequivocal testimony of a warranty that the machine was safe. After the machine had been used
approximately a dozen times, and had been cleaned after each successive
time, the separator bowl was violently ejected from its container, striking the plaintiff in the leg, breaking it. Action was brought October
14, 1935. After issues joined, the trial was held, at the close of which
the defendants moved for a nonsuit, which was granted.
1. There is no implied warranty of second-hand maHELD:
chinery.
2. Burden upon plaintiff to show an express warranty, which
she failed to do.
Mere statements of opinion such as puffing or praise of goods
3.
by seller is no warranty.
4. The Uniform Sales Act provides that no statement purporting to be a statement of seller's opinion shall be construed as a warranty.
"Remote damages are such as are the result of accident or
5.
an unusual combination of circumstances which could not reasonably
be anticipated, and over which the party sought to be charged had no
control."
A nonsuit may be a judgment upon the merits and may be
6.
peremptorily ordered for a failure or insufficiency of the evidence.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Hilliard concur.
SUPREME COURT RULE RIGHT-LIENS-RELATION BACK-MOTION
OF COMPLAINT-STATUTES-Chain O'Mines et al.
-ANSWER
vs. Lewison et al.-No. 13701-Decided March 22, 1937-District Court of Gilpin County-Hon. Samuel W. Johnson, Judge
-Affirmed.
Action was instituted below by defendants in error to
FACTS:
subject certain mining property of the plaintiffs in error to a lien for
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work, materials and power. Judgment was for defendants in error, and
no motion for new trial was filed and no order dispensing with the
necessity therefor appears in either the record or bill of exceptions.
HELD:
1. Rule 8 of the Supreme Court requires that the party
claiming error in the trial below must, unless otherwise ordered, move
the trial court for a new trial, and, without such order, only such
questions as are presented in the motion will be considered o.n review,
and issues of fact determined by the trial court cannot be reviewed by
the Supreme Court,
2. Lien statements must be filed before the expiration of one
month after the time of the completion of the improvements, to protect
lien rights.
3.
The court having determined the definite time of the commencement of the work upon the improvement, the liens relate back to,
and take effect as of that date.
4. By answering the complaint one waives any error in the
denial of a motion.
5.
The right to the liens provided for by Sec. 6445, C. L. 1921,
is not limited, but extends the lien privileges created by Sec. 6442, C. L.
1921, to those who do work or furnish materials and services under
the circumstances and for the purposes enumerated in Sec. 6445, without regard to whether or not such work is done or the materials or
services furnished in the "construction, alteration, addition to or repair"
of the mining property affected.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous, Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.
Justice Holland.
MALPRACTICE -

NEGLIGENCE -

WARRANTIES -

PHYSICIANS -

Gleason vs. Ralph McKeehan-No. 13847-Decided March 22,
1937-District Court of Latimer County-Hon. Frederic W.
Clark, Judge-Reversed.
FACTS:
Plaintiff in error, a physician and surgeon, against whom
defendant in error obtained a judgment for $5,000.00 upon a complaint alleging malpractice, assigns error. Defendant in error alleged
that a Caesarean operation was not the proper method of treatment for
the relief of an alleged pending miscarriage, and that plaintiff in error
knew or should have known that it was not the proper procedure;
notwithstanding he advised and performed the operation and in so
doing was negligent and careless. There was no evidence tending to
show that defendant in error was not skillful and careful in the actual
performance of the operation, that he neglected the patient in any way,
or that he did not give the patient proper care, or that he went outside
of the recognized field of practice.
HELD:
1. It is a rule in Colorado that: Defending physicians
in malpractice cases must first have left and entirely abandoned all
knowledge acquired in the fields of exploration and adopted some rash
or experimental methods before they approached the danger zone of

liability.
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2. Before liability attached to plaintiff in error, it must have
been shown that he was unskillful or negligent, and that through a
lack of his skill or care the patient died.
3. A physician is not, and never can be, a warrantor of cures or
even favorable results.
4. The competent physician in charge is bound only to exercise
his best skill and judgment in determining the course to be followed
and acting accordingly.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke, Mr.
Justice Young and Mr. Justice Knous dissent.

EVIDENCE -

JURY-

QUESTIONS OF FACT -AGENCY-

VERDICT-

PASSION OR PREJUDICE-NEGLIGENCE-Boutderado Motors vs.

Ruth Peterson-No. 13863-Decided March 29, 1937-District
Court of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, Judge-Affirmed.
FACTS: Defendant in error, as plaintiff, filed this action to
recover damages for personal injuries which she alleged she sustained
as a result of an automobile collision. A jury trial resulted in a verdict
in her favor and against the defendant in the sum of $10,364.00. To
review this judgment, the defendant, plaintiff in error here, prosecutes
this writ. The collision occurred at an intersection between the car
driven by plaintiff and a car owned by the defendant and operated by
Livingston. The principal question involved is the character of the
relationship existing between Livingston and the defendant. Plaintiff
alleges it to be that of employer and employee. Defendant, admitting
ownership of the car, denied any employment at the time of the collision, and tried the case upon the theory of bailment. The evidence
was conflicting as to whether the relationship was one of employer and
employee, and if so, whether Livingston was acting within the scope
of his employment.
1. Questions of fact are solely within the province of
HELD:
the jury, and its conclusions are final if the case was submitted to it
upon proper instructions which fully protected the legal rights of the
defendant. Proper instructions having been submitted to the jury, its
findings to the effect that Livingston was an employee of defendant,
and was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the
time of the accident cannot be disturbed.
2. If the amount of the verdict is so excessive as to reflect passion
or prejudice or if it discloses a result other than that of fair consideration, then it should not be allowed to stand as to the amount; however,
such was not the case in the present instance.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland. Mr. Chief Justice Burke and
Mr. Justice Knous concur.
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EVIDENCE-NEGLIGENCE-RES JUDICATA-DEFENSES-DISMISSAL
OF A PARTY-Boulderado Motors us. Roy W. Peterson and Min-

nie Peterson-No. 13864-Decided March 29, 1937-District
Court of Boulder County-Hon. Frederic W. Clark, JudgeAffirmed.
FACTS: This is a companion case to Boulderado Motors vs.
Peterson. The present case arises out of the same collision, and was instituted by defendants in error-they being the parents of Mildred
Peterson-to recover damages for her death resulting from injuries
received in the automobile collision involved in both cases. In this case
the driver of the car, Livingston, was joined with the defendant, now
plaintiff in error, as a party defendant.
Owing to the infancy of
Livingston, complications arose concerning service upon him and his
failure to appear, and plaintiff's counsel asked and obtained leave of
court to strike his name as defendant. Trial then proceeded against the
remaining defendant without objection, resulting in a judgment against
it in the sum of $3,500.00. No consideration had been received by
plaintiffs, from Livingston for his release; it was a voluntary dismissal
without consideration. For the first time defendant here interposes the
defense of res judicata or release, due to the dismissal of Livingston
from the case, and also that Livingston was an independent contractor.
HELD:
1. Res judicata is a defense that must always be pleaded
affirmatively.
If defendant seriously considered the dismissal of Livingston as providing a defense of res judicata, he should then and
there have interposed such defense. By proceeding further he waived
the benefit, if any, he could claim by reason of this defense.
2.
As to the defense based on the theory that Livingston was an
independent contractor, which was sought to be interposed for the first
time, the same rule applies, i. e., the court refuses to consider any question so belatedly presented.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Mr. Justice Knous concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Burke and

INSURANCE-REASONABLENESS OF INTERVENING TIME BETWEEN
INJURY AND HOSPITALIZATION-The Continental Casualty Co.
us. Youngblood-No. 14106-Decided March 29, 1937--County Court of Denver-Hon. George A. Luxford, Judge-Affirmed.
HELD:
When the provision for hospital indemnity found in an
accident insurance policy contains no restrictions as to time, nine months
intervening between the time of the injury and the hospitalization and
convalescence was not unreasonable so as to preclude the injured from

recovery under the policy.
Opinion by Mr. Justice Bakke.
Justice Hilliard concur.

Mr. Chief Justice Burke and Mr.

